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Interstate Branching and Banking Trends
Daniel Giedeman, Ph.D.
Department of Economics, Seidman School of Business
The United States banking system has been undergoing asignificant transformation during recent years. This trans-formation is largely the result of two regulatory changes
that the U.S. Congress passed during the 1990s. The first of
these changes came with the passage of the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in 1994, while
the second came with the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Services Modernization Act in 1999. The Riegle-Neal
Act changed the scale of banking by giving banks the ability to
open interstate branches, while the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
changed the scope of banking by repealing the Glass-Steagall
Act’s separation of commercial from investment banking. While
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act has received more recent attention
than the Riegle-Neal Act, the latter has likely had a greater influ-
ence on America’s banking system since the changes it has
prompted have had more time to take effect. 
Prior to the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act, American banks’ ability
to operate branches had been severely limited. Virtually all banks
were prohibited from operating branches across state lines and in
many states banks were prohibited from operating any branches at
all (even within the same county or city). A result of these prohibi-
tions was an American banking system comprised primarily of a
large number of relatively small banks. 
The Riegle-Neal Act set the stage for a rapid transition of the
American banking system from “small banking” into “large bank-
ing” by giving banks permission to operate widespread interstate
branching networks for basically the first time in U.S. history.
Although the Act is only eight years old and only fully went into
effect in 1997, it has already caused several significant changes in
the U.S. banking system. For example, in January 1994, prior to
the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act, there were ten commercial
banks operating a total of thirty branches across state lines. As of
June 2002, there were 327 commercial banks operating a total of
21,415 interstate branches. The impact of the Act can also be seen
in the Greater Grand Rapids metropolitan area (GGR). The most
notable impact has been the acquisition of Old Kent Bank by Fifth
Third Bank in 2001, but there have been additional changes as
well. Since 1994, six banks with headquarters located outside of
the State of Michigan have entered the GGR banking market.
Although these five banks represent only 17% of all banks in
GGR, they hold 58% of all deposits in the GGR market. It is clear
that the Riegle-Neal Act is changing the face of both the U.S.
banking system as well as our local banking system.
Most of the increase in interstate branching has come as a result of
banks acquiring or merging with banks in other states. A result of
these mergers and acquisitions has been a substantial decrease in
the number of small banks and the total amount of deposits
placed with these small banks. In June 1994 there were 8,614
FDIC-insured financial institutions (including commercial banks
and savings institutions) with deposits of less than $100 million.
By June 2002 the number of institutions with deposits of less than
$100 million had fallen to 4,916. As can been seen in Figure One,
during this same eight-year span the proportion of deposits at these
small financial institutions as a percentage of deposits at all institu-
tions fell from 10.5% to 4.5%. While small institutions have been
declining both in number and in influence, the opposite is happen-
ing for the largest financial institutions in America. The number of
institutions with more than $10 billion in deposits has grown from
sixty-four in 1994 to one hundred in 2002. Even more significantly,
the total amount of deposits at these largest institutions has
increased from 30% of total deposits to almost 60% of total
deposits. The trend is obvious, the United States is shifting dramat-
ically away from its traditional system of small financial institutions
to a new system where very large institutions are prevalent.
An important question that must be asked is whether this trend
toward bank consolidation will reduce or increase competition
among banks. The traditional argument against allowing banks to
operate widespread branching networks has been the fear of
“money trusts.” That is, Americans seem to have had an aversion
to allowing financial institutions to become large, at least in part
because they feared that large banks would be able to exploit
monopoly power and influence over small depositors and busi-
nesses.1 It has been also argued, however, that by limiting the
ability of banks to branch, the American banking system was actu-
ally less competitive than it would have been with the presence of
large branching networks. The rationale behind this argument is
that restrictions on branching prevented banks from reaching out
to enter new markets and, therefore, protected the banks already
in these markets. Without the threat of competition from
out-of-town banks, the local banks could exercise market power.
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Which argument is correct? Have banking markets become more
competitive or less competitive as a result of the elimination of
interstate banking restrictions? At first blush it might appear that
markets have become less competitive as the number of all finan-
cial institutions in the United States has declined from 12,933 in
1994 to 9,455 in 2002. The decline in the number of financial
institutions per capita is illustrated in Figure Two. It can be seen
that the ratio of persons per financial institution has increased in
the United States from one financial institution per 20,000 people
to one financial institution per 30,100 persons. These ratios have
also increased for the State of Michigan to one institution per
51,800 persons and very slightly for the Greater Grand Rapids
metropolitan area to one institution per 30,700 persons. 
Although the above figures seem to indicate that the banking sys-
tem is becoming less competitive, this is not necessarily the case.
The mere number of financial institutions does not automatically
reflect the market power of these institutions. It is very possible
that a market area might have many small banks but be dominated
by one or two very large banks. In this case the number of financial
institutions would suggest that the market was competitive even
though most of the market share was going to the small number of
large banks. To control for this situation, economists often use a
measure of market concentration called the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI). This index is derived by taking the sum of the
squares of market share for each business in a given market. The
higher the HHI, the more concentrated (and hence less competi-
tive) a market is seen to be. The U.S. Department of Justice uses
the HHI to evaluate mergers. If the HHI is less than 1000 for a
market, the Department of Justice generally considers that market
to be competitive. Markets with HHI values between 1000 and
1800 are viewed as moderately concentrated, while markets with
an HHI above 1800 are generally considered highly concentrated.
Figure Three presents the HHI values for Michigan’s nine metro-
politan areas as of June 2002. It can be seen that the banking
market in the Greater Grand Rapids area is exactly at the median
in terms of market concentration. It is more concentrated than
other comparable areas including Lansing and Kalamazoo/Battle
Creek, but it is slightly less concentrated than Detroit and signifi-
cantly less concentrated than other markets.
To see if the introduction of interstate banking has created signifi-
cant changes in bank concentration in GGR, I calculated the HHI
for GGR from 1994 to 2002. From the results presented in Figure
Four, it can be seen that the GGR banking market has been mod-
erately concentrated for the past decade without significant trends
upward or downward. It can be observed, however, that the highly
publicized acquisition of Old Kent Bank by Fifth Third Bank in
2001 appears to have actually lessened banking market con-
centration in the Greater Grand Rapids area. This is almost
certainly because the Federal Reserve Board stipulated that Fifth
Third had to divest several branch offices in order to gain
approval for the acquisition.
Overall, the findings indicate that the competitiveness of the
Greater Grand Rapids banking system has not been significantly
affected either positively or negatively by the introduction of
interstate branch-banking networks that was prompted by the
Riegle-Neal Act. This negligible effect is likely largely because
Michigan, unlike many other states, allowed intrastate branching
networks to develop for several decades before the Riegle-Neal Act
was enacted.
1This argument was promoted by the Popularist movement a century ago, but it can also be traced back as far as Thomas Jefferson. It is interesting that in no other country except America has
there seemed to be such an aversion to large-scale banking and that nationwide branch-banking systems existed in all other industrialized nations by the early part of the twentieth century.
